ERIE’s Attacker:   The U-163

At the conclusion of World War II, Allied forces confiscated the records of the German U-boat Command (Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote). Only after the war diary (Kriegstagebuch) of each U-boat had been examined did authorities learn that the U-163 had torpedoed the USS ERIE on 12 November 1942.

The ERIE’s attacker was a Type IX-C long-range attack submarine that had a range of 13,450 nautical miles at 10 knots (surfaced). Pictured below are some members of the U-163’s crew standing on her foredeck (U-163 is the sub nearest the dock), probably during ice training at Stettin, Germany, in early 1942.

Like all Type IX-C subs, the U-163 was fitted with four bow torpedo tubes, and two at the stern, and carried a load of 22 torpedoes when she went on war patrol. Eight of these were carried in the forward torpedo room (four in the tubes, and four in ready reserve), four were stowed in the aft torpedo room (two in the tubes and two in reserve), and the remaining ten were held in an upper deck casing in water-tight containers.  The sub’s other armament included a 105mm gun on the foredeck, and two anti-aircraft guns aft (a 37mm gun in the aft section of the bridge and a 20mm gun on the afterdeck). Pictured below is the U-163’s gunnery crew shooting 105mm practice rounds.

The following day, 6 November, the U-Boat Command radioed the U-163 to head to the west and operate in the area off the island of Curacao (Netherlands West Indies).  Traveling westward, the U-163 arrived off the northern coast of Curacao on 11 November at 1200 hours local time (all times listed hereafter will be local time), intending to maneuver around the island the next day (submerged), in order to investigate its harbors.

Just before midnight on the 11^th, Commander Engelmann made a most fateful decision, as far as the USS ERIE was concerned.  Directed to move away from the Curacao area in order to hand over the U-163’s doctor to Zschech on the U-505, Engelmann signaled the U-boat Command that he was not in a sea sector close to the U-505 (as the U-Boat Command surmised) and that any attempt to deliver the physician to Zschech would waste too much time.  No order was received countermanding his signal, and so the U-163 proceeded submerged to the west of Willemstad harbor, at 0800 on the morning of 12 November.

At 1130, just a half hour before she moved into a position closer to the mouth of Willemstad harbor, the escort vessels for a five-tanker subsidiary convoy due to rendezvous with the ERIE-led convoy, TAG-20, moved out on patrol duties.  These included HNMS VAN KINSBERGEN, the PC-583, the PC-589, and the SC-533.  One of these patrol vessels was later picked up by the U-163’s sound detection equipment, causing her to move even closer to the harbor entrance at 1415.

In her new position, the U-163 found herself positioned directly under the five  tankers which had been ordered to join TAG-20 for the trip to Guantanamo Bay (and then on to New York), plus HNMS QUEEN WILHELMINA (the former PC-468) and a Dutch motor torpedo boat.  Despite maneuvering difficulties, the U-163 fired a spread shot at two of the tankers from her stern tubes at 1440 hours. Both were misses, although the crew reported hearing the sound of two explosions and breaking bulkheads.  (No visual confirmation was possible within the sub, because the U-163 was nearly rammed, “lost her bubble” and was forced to submerge to 150 meters).

The U-163 then awaited a depth charge attack that never occurred. When nothing further was heard or seen in the direction of Willemstad harbor, the sub slowly moved away from the coast, submerged, at 1625. This brought her right under TAG-20 arriving from Trinidad, with the five tankers from Curacao now also within her formation (they had joined the convoy 15 minutes earlier).

In addition to the 5 escort vessels mentioned above, TAG-20 now included the 6 main convoy escorts (USS ERIE, USS BIDDLE, USS SPRY, and PCs 545, 624 and 573) and the following merchant vessels:

BETA (U.S. cargo ship bound for New York)

CITY OF FLINT (U.S. cargo ship bound for New York)

CUSTODIAN (British cargo ship bound for New York, then U.K.)

DAGEID (Norwegian tanker bound for New York, then U.K.)

DUNBOYNE (U.S. cargo ship bound for Mobile)

EXMOUTH (U.S. cargo ship, Commodore ship of convoy, bound for New York)

FERNBANK (Norwegian cargo ship bound for New York, then U.K.)

HOLMBURY (British cargo ship bound for Sydney, C.B.)

LITIOPA (Norwegian tanker bound for New York, then U.K.)

LUNA (Dutch cargo vessel bound for Mobile)

NORHOLM (Norwegian tanker bound for New York, then U.K.)

POLARSOL (Norwegian tanker bound for New York, then U.K.)

RIBERA (British cargo ship bound for New York, then U.K.)

STAD VLAARDINGEN (Dutch cargo ship bound for New York)

TEMPLE YARD (British cargo ship bound for New York)

THOMAS P. BEAL (U.S. cargo ship bound for New York)

Two other vessels which had left Trinidad with TAG-20 moved out of the convoy formation as it approached Curacao.  Escorted by a Dutch patrol torpedo boat to Willemstad were the U.S. Navy “Q ship,” the BIG HORN (an armed vessel disguised as a tanker meant to attract the attention of unsuspecting U-boats) and the Venezuelan tanker NATURINES (bound for Aruba).  These ships were about a mile off the mouth of Willemstad harbor when the ERIE was torpedoed at 1701.

In the midst of the 16 merchant vessels plus the 11 patrol vessels, the U-163 began her hunt for a suitable target, which turned out to be the USS ERIE, identified by Commander Engelmann as a “destroyer.”

The war diary of the U-163 tells the remainder of the story:

……….

1640:  Destroyer noises are coming nearer again.  In a little while, first two, then a third destroyer are recognizable.  They are moving at full speed on zigzag courses, and there is lively Morse Code traffic between them.  No doubt now that they are bound to hunt us.  I am attempting to attack one destroyer, but I can’t come along side of it. There comes one from aft and to my starboard side, and it is now running at half speed. Great!

1700:  [Firing] a fan-shot of three [torpedoes] with tubes I, II, and IV at the destroyer.  [It is a] Somers [should read “Sumner”] class.  Enemy traveling at 16 knots, course 40 degrees, distance 800 meters, bearing right 95 degrees.

After 109 seconds, there is a medium strength torpedo detonation, followed shortly by a second one.  Observed at the target a cloud from the explosion high over the bridge of the destroyer; it is a dark, wide cloud.  [There is a] fire.  Then there is also fire amidships.  Towering flames.

1707:  [Firing] a single torpedo at the burning destroyer. [It is] a miss.  The destroyer had turned when hit and I overestimated the momentum of the ship after it was hit. (Traveling 8 knots, distance 800 [meters], bearing right 73 degrees.)  I fired this torpedo, even though the destroyer was slowly sinking astern, because, with the harbor being so near, I wanted to make rescue actions impossible.

……….

With the ERIE ablaze and heading into a wind from the east (to keep the flames from spreading forward from the stern), the other TAG-20 escorts moved into position to either aid the ERIE, guard the convoy, or deal with the U-163.

The USS BIDDLE moved into position as convoy commander. An eight-depth charge pattern was dropped by the USS SPRY off the starboard bow of the convoy (at 1709). As the BIDDLE, SPRY, VAN KINSBERGEN, and SC-533 searched the area around the ERIE, (apparently) false sound contacts caused the SC-533 and a Dutch motor torpedo boat to drop additional charges. This incited merchant vessels in the starboard convoy columns to shell the area where these escorts were, which also endangered ERIE survivors who were in the water.  As a result, the commander of the VAN KINSBERGEN positioned his ship between the firing vessels and the helpless survivors, and offered other assistance by lowering two life rafts and a motorboat that rescued a number of endangered crewmembers.

As best as can be determined, the charges dropped initially (to the starboard of the convoy) were of no avail, because the U-163 was already moving to the south-southwest, under the convoy and at a depth well below that set for the explosion of these charges.

About a half hour later, the PC-545 reported seeing “the periscope and about four feet of the conning tower” of the U-163, about one mile distant off the port quarter of the convoy.  Several merchant vessels also sighted what they thought was the ERIE’s attacker, and they responded by opening fire, first with machine guns and then with their stern guns, in the direction of the PC-545 and the QUEEN WILHELMINA. Minutes later, the PC-545 obtained a weak sound contact and dropped a 5-charge pattern and then, 500 yards off the PC’s starboard bow, the QUEEN WILHELMINA laid down another depth charge barrage.  None of these charges impacted the U-163.

With the convoy lumbering away, the VAN KINSBERGEN, QUEEN WILHELMINA and the PC-624 swept the area six miles astern of the convoy with no success. At 1927 they were ordered to rejoin the convoy, which they did shortly after midnight.

By that time the U-163 had begun moving to a point just north of Aruba, apparently hoping to meet up with TAG-20 along the normal convoy route.  No contact was made, however, owing to a second diversion of TAG-20 (which had been proposed by the Commander of the ERIE, A.R. Mack) to a route passing through a channel south and west of Aruba, then northward and back onto the normal Curacao to Guantanamo Bay route.

On 13 November, the U-163 was ordered to move eastward in the vicinity of the Lesser Antilles islands.  Near the island of Martinique, on 18 November, the U-163 was attacked by a British Hudson-type bomber which dropped four bombs on her. The sub managed to escape unscathed.  The next day, she did not fare quite as well, when another Hudson attacked just east of the Lesser Antilles.  The Hudson’s four depth charges caused minor damage that was quickly repaired.

The sub continued her search for merchant vessels east of the Barbados.  Two days later, she sighted smoke pouring from the stacks of two freighters.  She began pursuing one, but broke off the hunt after a half hour. With the smoke of the second vessel still visible, the U-163 began pursuing her.  She was the 6,060 ton British steamer, the EMPIRE STARLING, transporting frozen and canned meats, mail and other goods to Trinidad. After she tailed the vessel for seven hours, the U-163 launched a spread shot of three torpedoes.  Two hit the EMPIRE STARLING, causing her to list slightly.  Minutes later the finishing shot was loosed, and she sank to the floor of the Atlantic.

The 55-man crew all survived the sinking and were left to fend for themselves in four life boats.  The Master of the ship, Eric Monckton, was taken aboard the U-163 and ultimately transported to a Prisoner-of-War camp for Allied Mariners, Milag Nord.

The next evening, the U-163 encountered convoy BNN-3 about three hundred miles east of Barbados. After trailing the convoy for about three hours, the U-163 fired torpedoes from both of her stern tubes, one of which struck and sank the 3,766 ton Brazilian steamer, the APALOIDE, captained by J.S. Silva.  The torpedo explosion and sinking resulted in the loss of five of the ship’s 57-man crew.

Patrolling in the same marine quadrant over the next ten days resulted in no sightings of suitable targets.  On 2 December, the U-163 was ordered to return to her homeport as soon as its diesel fuel stocks reached the 40 meter³ mark.  Since its supply was then 46 meters³, Engelmann decided to pursue reports from the U-505 that the hunt for merchant vessels would be more successful to the south.

Two days later, she encountered two U.S. Navy vessels, the cruiser USS OMAHA and the destroyer USS JEWETT steaming about 400 miles east of Trinidad.  After a short pursuit, the U-163 launched a 3-torpedo fan shot at the OMAHA, but all three were misses.  The JEWETT quickly responded by laying down three heavy depth charge patterns, none of which damaged the U-163.

With her fuel stores now at a minimum, the U-163 headed home.  Along the return route, she met up with three other U-boats (154, 129 and 505) that had been part of operational group “Southwards.  All four were re-provisioned and re-fueled by a supply boat (“milk cow”), the U-463.  On 6 January 1943, the U-163 docked in her sub pen at Lorient, ending an 81-day, 12,409 nautical mile, war patrol.

Loss of the U-163:  In Brief

During the months of January and February 1943, the U-163 was reconditioned and modernized, in preparation for her third war patrol. Fully provisioned and with a complement of 57 men on board, she left Lorient on 10 March 1943. Her immediate objective was to rendezvous with the German blockade breaker, the REGENSBURG, in order to hand over special orders and other materials.

On her third day at sea, the U-163 encountered the allied convoy MKS-9 in the western reaches of the Bay of Biscay, enroute from Gibraltar to the U.K.  Shortly after the U-163 began her attack on the convoy, it was picked up by a newly installed radar unit on one of the escorts, the Canadian corvette, HMCS PRESCOTT (K-161).  Two different views of the PRESCOTT are presented below.

Multiple depth charge patterns laid down by the PRESCOTT drove the U-163 down, and a final barrage of nine depth charges set to 350 and 550 feet sank her.  Although no visual confirmation was made, all contact with the sub was lost around 2330 on the 13^th of March.  All 57 men aboard the boat went to a watery grave that night.

The U-boat Commander inserted the following remarks regarding her loss in the war diary of the U-163:

No action reports are coming in. Ordered to report her position on the 15^th and 16^th [of March], the boat fails to respond.

Loss by aerial bombardment or mines is possible.

On April 24, the U-163 was declared as “missing,” effective 15 March 1943, and assigned a star. [A star was assigned to U-boats on official loss assessment lists when they were deemed a probable loss.] 

Loss of the U-163: In Detail

In the course of researching the fate of the U-163, the author was privileged to make the acquaintance of Collin R. Mullens, a former Royal Navy Wireless Mechanic who served aboard the HMCS PRESCOTT. In June 2000, Mr. Mullens graciously provided me with detailed information concerning the PRESCOTT’s sinking of the U-163 --- information which I promised to post on this website.  Unfortunately, before I was able to post the information, he passed away (on 15 August 2001).

As a salute to one of the brave and selfless “juicers” (wireless operators) who helped procure our freedoms in the Western Approaches during World War II, I include the following regarding Collin R. Mullens and the PRESCOTT’s sinking of the U-163.

Thus, on 27 November 1942, Collin Mullens came aboard the PRESCOTT in Londonderry and, nearly four months later, was in her 271 Radar Office (and on the bridge behind Captain W. McIsaac) when she made contact with the U-163 during the evening of 13 March 1943.

The following is Mullen’s transcription of Captain McIsaac’s report of 15 March 1943, detailing actions taken against the U-163. (Note: this report mistakenly assumed that there were two U-boat attackers. Per Collin Mullens, this was subsequently established to be just one U-boat.)

……….

At 2149 R.D.F. picked up an echo at 3400 yards, bearing 066 degrees. Convoy course was 006 degrees. Course was at once altered towards and the echo closed rapidly to 2100 yards.  At 1400 yards a U-boat could be seen diving and very strong hydrophone effect was reported.

At 2155 a submarine was sighted off the port bow going away from us.  The first submarine, according to doppler and change of range and bearing, was coming towards us and moving right. This movement right appeared to be only slight and was noted only in the earlier stages of the attack. When we were some distance from our target, the second submarine, which may have been zig-zagging, began to loom very large on the port bow. Course was altered to port towards it.

At 2158½ the A/S C.O. fired a five-charge pattern, in spite of this unexpected alteration of course. We then opened fire on the second submarine, firing two H.E. and one star shell.  No hits were observed but the submarine was already going away from us at high speed and was almost immediately seen to dive, Asdic contact was immediate at 600 yards.

Nine charges were fired at 2204½, time to fire being obtained from the recorder.  One charge was not fired, because the firing buzzer did not function in this attack, the order to fire being passed by telephone. Bearing was reported drawing right shortly before contact was lost.

After running out and back over the spot, we began to carry out “Observant”, along with H.M.C.S. Napanee which came up at this time.  Napanee was ordered to do the southern half of the square, while we searched the northern half.

At 2319 we picked up an asdic echo about 1500 yards north of where the second submarine had dived.  It was classified as doubtful, and contact was lost at about 400 yards.

We ran in on it a second time and regained contact at 1500 yards. This was at 2326. Extent of target was about eight degrees, but it showed no movement either on the set or the plot.  However, the echo was sharp and believing that it might be the second submarine lying deep, we decided to attack. Contact was again held to 400 yards, and nine charges set to 350 and 550 feet were dropped, time to fire being obtained by stopwatch.

According to the plot, some of these charges were on the target.  We continued to search the area but did not regain contact. We then carried on with our search of the larger area, dropping single charges at our three points of attack, time to fire being obtained from the plot.  No evidence of destruction or of anything else out of the ordinary could be found, though many non-sub echoes were encountered.

At 0210/14 we left to rejoin the convoy, having previously been ordered to search until 0200.

The trace of the first attack dried out in the recorder. The trace of the second attack is reasonably well preserved; the echo in the third attack left only a very faint trace, which also faded out before it could be dried.

When first detected the U-boats appeared to be in quarter line ahead about a mile apart and coming in to attack the convoy.  The second one, which was seen well on the surface, was painted light grey.  This, in the prevailing visibility, made it look deceptively like an escort vessel. No further attacks were made on the convoy.

[End of Narrative found in Enclosure 6 to Commodore, Londonderry’s No. LY 40/250 OP, dated 4 April 1943, to Commander in Chief, Western Approaches, et al.]

During her three war patrols, the U-163 sank three merchant vessels (all described above).  She also badly damaged the USS ERIE, which sank 23 days after the U-163 torpedoed her (in part because those in charge of salvage operations badly miscalculated negative buoyancy factors). The final assessment of the U-163 on behalf of the U-boat Commander (Admiral Doenitz) seemingly speaks to a less than stellar performance of her commanding officer and crew:

The commander strove to take advantage of every opportunity and sought for good results.

Torpedo engagements were unsatisfactory and can be tied to definite deficiencies in attack experience, thus, the three-torpedo fan shot on 21 November at a single steamer 500 meters distant was excessive, as well, the spread shot on December 4 at the Marblehead-type cruiser must be deemed wrong, considering the hopeless distance and position.